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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
vs. : 
GORDON LEON WALLS : Case No. 20030139 
Defendant/Appellant- : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty by the 
defendant to the charge of Murder, a first-degree felony. The plea of guilty was 
taken before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan on the 26th day of March 2002. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA? 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for appeal 
by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea ( R. 118), and hearings and a 
ruling on that motion.(R. 183, 184) 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. 
1 
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)." The Court applies "the clearly erroneous 
standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that 
decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) "However, the 
ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional 
and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See 
also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO INSURE THAT A PROPER RULE 11 
DETERMINATION OF VOLUNTARINESS WAS MADE? 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was not fully preservedfor 
appeal despite the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea ( R. 118), and 
hearings and a ruling on that motion.(R. 183, 184), since the issue of the plea 
bargain was not addressed in the motion. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: Since the issue was not addressed in the 
Defendant's motion for a new trial, the plain error standard applies. "To establish 
plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. 
Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). "However, the 
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ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional 
and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See 
also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 76-5-203. Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab 
Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is 
younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child 
under Section 76-5-404.1; 
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(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of 
another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of 
death to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted 
commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted 
commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate 
offense; and 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is 
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killed in the course 01 me commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense; 
i e i the actor recklessly causes the death of a. peace officer while in 
the commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer u:.:.:: >_v = - r 
(ii) interference w un
 a peace officer wnne maKing a lau iui arrest 
under Section ~^ ~^ ~ M^ if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder but the 
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder but special mitigation is 
established under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first-degree felony. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or 
attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another i 
attempted to cause the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there 
is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not 
legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) 1 ''tula* Subsection (4)|ci)(i> emolioiul distress dors nol im:lmlr 
(l) a condition ivsulliiK! fro in inonliil IIIIKNS ns defined in Section 
76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own 
conduct. 
(cj The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection 
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(4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection 
(4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person 
under the then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
Section 77-15-1- Incompetent person not to be tried for public offense. 
No person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public 
offense. 
Section 77-18-5 
Reports by courts and prosecuting attorneys to Board of Pardons and Parole. In 
cases where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the judge and prosecuting 
attorney may, within 30 days, mail a statement to the Board of Pardons and Parole 
setting forth the term for which the prisoner ought to be imprisoned together with 
any information which might aid the board in passing on the application for 
termination or commutation of the sentence or for parole or pardon. 
Section 77-27-5- Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision when 
and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state, 
persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or 
correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise 
limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have 
their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e) 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: . 
(1) If the defeixr- v rrt represented by counsel, v - VA . igly 
waived the right to counsel and d^es not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is \ :)li intai il) i nade; 
(3) the ueieriaani know* oi the righi ;o ihe presumption ^f innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right ic a speed} public trial before an 
impartial jur\. the rig!-., ; confront M\K cross-examine -:: • ;vr. . .. 
prosecution witnesses, the righi to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which 
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable d.*"> \>»\i +u - the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis ror me pica. /\ uiciuu: !_\i^ \> sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed h\ the defendant or; if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution 
has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows UK. minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, 
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for 
each offense to whic^ a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
( 6 ) l; iiiC l e i i u e i e u pjcu o u I L M I H WJ U pi;* •*•• • . -• ' •••.< - - i / ' vc -^ -n t , 
and !* •/ '•vha* -^^ M^T^nr ]T-^  hp^n n^-vh^l 
( 7) tl le defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
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These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that 
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire 
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was originally charged in an information filed June 15, 2001 
with the offense of Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203 (R. 10). On June 15, 2001 the Defendant made an initial appearance 
and the information was read (R. 16). On August 27, 2001 , the preliminary 
hearing was held, and the Defendant was bound over for arraignment. (R. 78) The 
case was eventually set for trial, which was scheduled for a five-day jury trial to 
begin on April 22, 2002. The Defendant ultimately entered a plea of guilty to the 
offense of Murder, a first degree felony as charged, before the Honorable Judge 
Pamela Heffernan on March 26, 2002.(R. 99) 
On April 25, 2002, the Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea,(R. I l l) and after several delays the case was set for hearings and a 
determination on the motion. On January 28, 2003, Judge Heffernan denied the 
Defendant's motion,(R. 184) and sentenced the Defendant to an indeterminate term 
of 5 years to life in the Utah State Prison. The prison term was commenced on that 
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i •' 184/57) The Defendant has received an original hearing date before the 
Board of Pardons in June 2016. 
This judgment and conviction was entered on February 18, 2003,,, and the 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on F ebruary 21), Jlilb (R I 'll I 
s r 4: i EMEN roF IJIK IM is 
I he [defendant \* a s originalb c! larged in an information dated June 15, 
2001, with the offense of Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (R. 10). 
After several court appearances the Defendant entered into plea negotiations, 
nnri ^P March _; . ~uw_ i;^ Defendant .:_,;, - , 3 
• : /• : ** • " i uidi lie serve a period of tunc of 
incarceration between ,2 years." (R. 186/2) 
At the time of the entry of the guilty plea, the trial court conducted a Rule 11 
colloquy. Attorney Martin r ~ ^ : : represented UK Defendant at the hearing. 
|K,IK() 2) The Defendant stated lha( hi, had talked In I L i II-JUS and if Ik I ad "any 
iiinthiiiji, | he| fiiil need[edl t • ' [the court] know that". (R. 186/4) 
Ihe trial court then went though the Defendant's rights, including the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, Ihe right In a speed}' trial before an 
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impartial jury, the presumption of innocence, and the right to have the State pay to 
subpoena any witnesses the Defendant desired for his defense. (R. 186/4,5) The 
court further advised the Defendant of his right to confront the witnesses against 
him, and the right not to testify at trial, and that his decision not to testify could not 
be used against him. (R. 186/5) The court advised the Defendant that the State had 
the burden of proof, and would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
each element of the.(R. 186/6) The court then went though the elements of the 
offenses to which the Defendant was pleading guilty. (R. 186/6) The-court advised 
the Defendant that by pleading guilty he would be waiving these rights. (R. 186/5) 
The trial court then went through the possible maximum sentences on the 
charge to which the Defendant was pleading guilty, (R. 186/7) The court told the 
Defendant "You should also be aware that just because the State writes a letter to 
the parole authority doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation." To 
which the Defendant answered, "Yeah, I've been told." (R. 186/7) The court 
further advised the Defendant " So you shouldn't rely on anything that the State 
has indicated they may or may not do in entering this sentence because you could 
serve a lot longer than what they're going to recommend" (R. 186/7,8) The court 
advised the Defendant that he had 30 days to withdraw his guilty plea, and that by 
pleading guilty he had very limited appeal rights. (R. 186/8) The court established 
that he was pleading guilty of his "own free will and choice" and that he was not 
10 
uindc! t lie* influenrt: nf .insthini1 lluit vuniilil iffnl his \\h\\\\\ In nil IT I I nowing 
guilty plea. (R. 186/8-10) The Defendant did tell the court that he wras supposed to 
be taking the prescription drug of Haldol and/or Thorazine, but that he was not 
taking those medications. (R. 186'°,! 0) The court then asked the prosecutor to give 
a factual basis for the plea, to w h,c.i ;he prosecutor gave ai; . .uc^^i, ...••. .. 
•**• ^ - * rJ attacking me", and "Mr. Tillet 
attacked me twice that night. The first time I didn't kick him in the head or 
nothing. Then later that evening then [sic] he attacked me again. That's when he 
got kicked in the head/' (R. 186/12) 
The court then went though an expiation agreement .;:.:;:, . .. • f 
/ ui • .. . Defendai it had signe :1 It * as • : *' ~ • ^ - ' - : •" "••.i:it * »t 
• • r *\ snent, bi it tl mt the Defendant's a;! " •*; "-1 * * r *\ ^ {- ' ••.• ia n Lu him, 
nut cAdCtiy word for word, but pretty muvii.
 vk. i&L, IJJ The court acknowledged 
that "I don't think it's going to do a whole lot of good unless it was read word for 
word, but I think I've covered his rights sufficiently anyway." I K, I \\h 14 i 
Oi i \pfii 25, 2002, tl: le Defer idant filed a pro se i i lotioi I oi lettei I: :) \ ithdi a w 
defenders file a forn lal motic i i (E 181/2) \ t the i lext hearing -: '• -ipust 6, 2002 
the defense requested that an alienist be appointed to assess the Defendant's mental 
11 
status, specifically, his ability to have knowingly entered his plea of guilty, and the 
court appointed two alienist to explore this issue. (R. 181/4-12) The court then 
continued the case until November 20, 2002 for a hearing as to the Defendant's 
competence to enter a plea. At that hearing two witnesses were called, Mr. Rhett 
Potter, a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, and Dr. Rick Hawks, a psychologist. 
Mr. Potter interviewed the defendant and found "Bottom line on it was that 
seemed to me he was tracking appropriately, that he understood what the charges 
were, he understood the possible penalties." (R. 183/17) He testified that the 
Defendant told him that he heard voices, which had told him to enter the guilty 
plea, but Mr. Potter stated, "With the information that he gave me about the way 
the voices were ostensibly acting at that point in time did not seem consistent with 
the way that auditory hallucinations work with a person who has schizophrenia." 
(R. 183/20) Mr. Potter stated that at the time of the interview that he "felt him to 
be competent" but that he didn't make a specific finding of competence for the 
period of March 26, 2002. (R. 183/25) 
Dr Rick Hawks also evaluated the Defendant for mental competency. He 
testified that it was possible that the Defendant was faking mental illness. 
(R. 183/32) He also found originally that the Defendant may have so mental 
illness, including schizophrenia, but could not make such a finding, or rule such a 
diagnosis out. (R. 183/32,33) Furthermore, he did not do an analysis of the 
12 
Defendant 's mental stale as u( I he daU oi the | It a, an Il l h a r l n r e Ih " <" unit 
liiidiiiiiiet! Illir hcannii, appointed iinothnr psychologist, and instructed both to 
determine the Defendant 's mental competency as of the date of the plea. (R. 
183/63-67) 
After additional examinations Dr. Hawks produced an amended report, and 
testified on Jan28, 2003 ilim ^ inc nine or me p i c u\<. ^eicnau:. t t<;;pcara: to 
comprehend and appreciate the chai ges ai id allegations against hin : i " (R 1.84/10) 
"'< -! H -:-^  the , \ ^ ounsel pertinent facts, events, and states 
of mind,"' (R. 184/10) and was able to "adequately [comprehend] and [appreciate] 
the range and nature of possible penalties." /T? 1 S 4 1 - ) He understood the 
adversary nature of the proceedings against hi in'" and manifested appropriate 
courtroom behavior on M a n h 2(> [2(10?.]" \V 1 vl M" I I i I M Hawks tcstmeil (h.ii 
Ilk. Defendanl tlnl lw\e J liitirl.i! 11111 c • • -. • i m ill *»chi/pplirenii' speef i inri""1 ".i 
psychotic thoi ight disorder, pei haps r ' (R 18 : I-/15) 
Dr. Beverly O'Connor, a neuropsychologist was then called to testify. She 
testified that although it was possible the Defendant was faking a mental illness, 
she thought he was trying to cooperate, and not faking a mental illness, (R.,184/ 
_ ,^  .- ^ n n o r opined Mini mi I \lan/b .""<('» '(Hi1 ilk UetentLtiif u.)1. n >i 
* ' * . * '
 :
 delusional disorder, or a 
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paranoid schizophrenia, combined with a low verbal IQ, combined with verbal 
comprehension difficulties." (R. 184 / 35) 
The court then ruled, "Mr. Walls was competent to enter his plea, that he did 
knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea." (R. 184/51), and that the preponderance 
of the evidence indicated that the Defendant was malingering. (R. 184/53) The 
court then sentenced the Defendant to an indeterminate term in the Utah State 
Prison of 5 years to life, with a recommendation of credit for time served. The 
prison term was commenced on that day. (R. 184/57) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to plea negotiations on 
March 26, 2002. At the time of the entry of his pleas of guilty, the Defendant was 
present in court and the trial court commenced a Rule 11 (Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure) colloquy. The Defendant was suffering from a mental illness, for 
which prescription medication had been prescribed, but which the Defendant was 
not taking. The Defendant was suffering from "a probable mental illness that was 
either some kind of delusional disorder, or a paranoid schizophrenia, combined 
with a low verbal IQ, combined with verbal comprehension difficulties/' (R. 184 / 
35) Although the court made a finding that the defendant was competent to enter 
his plea, the evidence would suggest that there were questions as to the 
Defendant's mental ability to enter the plea, and therefore the Defendant was 
14 
entitled to have his i i ineh filed motion " v i'klr;pv '»'p pint urantu' I'ho M" jl «, mirt 
denkvl \hv< 111 c > i ii * in in I'urtluTinoiv (lie Defendant pled tmiltv pursuant to a plea 
negotiation in
 AiA L«L defendant was offered, that the 
prosecution would recommend tr me BoarJ of Pardons that he serve 1 0 to 12 
years, was an illusory promise that both the prosecution and defense counsel would 
know had no effect on the Defendant's prison sentence. 
' ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ~^NYINC TTIF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUU/i l 
PLEA 
"I »n March J<>, JI'OOJ! ihe Defendant entered a guilty plea . - . . 
. .*>i~ ,cuiw ^ i ill' " Defendant 
• • ' • ; . ' • • . ; , . . . , . ., 111C irial court thereafter 
held several hearing, including tw o da> s of evidentiary hearings on the 
Defendant's motion, including the testimony of three alienists w ho testified as to 
the Defendant's probable mental state at the time of the entry o; p^a. A;-er :hose 
hearings, he trial court denied tit le Defer idai it s i i lotioi l tc • \ v ithdi a\ v 1 lis plea. 
: -^  " " - :; ' * Iciiiui uf a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." I lie Court has further noted that 
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it applies "the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made 
in conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 
1999) "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied 
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 
558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996) 
The trial court therefore, must ensure that the Defendant's plea has strictly 
met all the requirements of Rule 11, as well as meeting all .constitutional 
requirements, and any failure in the process requires the granting of a subsequent 
motion by the Defendant to withdraw his plea. A trial court abuses its discretion by 
failing to grant the motion to withdraw the plea when a Rule 11 violation is 
present. In State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117,123 the court held: 
We hold the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying Mora's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court that accepted the 
plea failed to strictly comply with rule 11 when it accepted Mora's 
guilty plea without correctly incorporating the affidavit into the record 
or establishing elsewhere on the record that Mora knew the State was 
required to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See also State v. Dean, 57 P.3d 1106 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002) where the Court reversed 
a denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea where the trial court violated 
Rule 11 by failing to advise him of his speedy trial rights. The Court in State v. 
Dean, ruled that the failure to advise under Rule 11 constituted plain error. 
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In the present case, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his plea, 
based in part on Rule 11 violations of voluntariness. The Defendant was suffering 
from a significant mental illness, and was not taking his prescribed medication at 
the time the plea was taken making the issue of mental competence and therefore 
voluntariness an issue. The reviewing trial court made a ruling in violation of the 
strict compliance requirement of Rule 11, and therefore abused its discretion. 
In the case oi Jacobs v. State, 20 P.3d 382 (Utah 2001) the court, in denying 
a ten year post conviction habeas corpus petition noted that, -'"A mentally 
incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings against such a 
defendant do not comport with due process.' State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 
(Utah 1989) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (I960))." In the case of 
York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) this Court held: "Due 
process requires that a defendant be competent to plead guilty, (citing Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975))" 
This concept is not only mandated by due process requirements, but is 
statutory as well. UCA §77-15-1 provides that, "[n]o person who is incompetent to 
proceed shall be tried for a public offense." 
In the present case, although the trial court held a hearing to determine 
competency, the court abused it's discretion in denying the Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea due to the Rule 11 voluntariness issue. Both psychologists 
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acknowledged that the Defendant most likely had a mental illness at the time of the 
plea. Dr. Hawks testified that the Defendant did have a mental illness in the 
"schizophrenic spectrum", "a psychotic thought disorder, perhaps." (R. 184/15) 
and Dr. O'Connor testified, "I felt like he had a mental illness - a probable mental 
illness that was either some kind of delusional disorder, or a paranoid 
schizophrenia, combined with a low verbal IQ, combined with verbal 
comprehension difficulties." (R. 184 / 35) 
Both psychologists understood that at the time of the entry of plea, the 
Defendant was prescribed but was not taking either of two medications (Haldol or 
Thorizine, (R. 186/9,10)) to treat a suspected mental illness. 
Although Dr. Hawks, as well as Mr. Potter believed that the Defendant was 
malingering, (R. 183/32), and Dr. O'Connor conceded that the Defendant might be 
malingering, (R.184 / 27,33) there is sufficient doubt as to the Defendant's mental 
state at the time of the guilty pleas to require the trial court to allow the 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO INSURE THAT A PROPER RULE 11 
DETERMINATION OF VOLUNTARINESS WAS MADE. 
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Murder, a first-
degree felony, as charged in the original information. The plea negotiation process 
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resulted in only one promise or supposed benefit to the Defendant by entering into 
the plea. The Defendant was promised that the prosecution would write a letter to 
the Board of Pardons recommending that he serve a sentence of a maximum of 10 
to 12 years on the charge. That single promise induced the Defendant to plead 
guilty, and that single promise was known by both the prosecution as well as 
defense counsel to have little or no effect on the Board of Pardons decision on the 
Defendant's parole date. 
In the case of State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the 
Court ruled that, "[b]oth the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
have allowed a Rule 11 challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be considered 
for the first time on appeal." Further, in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 
(1969) the Supreme Court reversed a guilty plea holding: "It was error, plain on the 
face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an 
affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Although in the Boykin 
decision, the Court was presented with a plea to a then capital offense and the court 
taking the plea did not ask any questions regarding the plea, the fundamental 
principles are the same. 
In the case of State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 the Court ruled: "To 
establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. (See 
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also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). In the case of State 
v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held "Under [the plain 
error] standard, we will not reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and 
that the error was both obvious and harmful". See also State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 
1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)1 where the Court addressed the issue of plain 
error in a Rule 11 violation case, and stated: 
To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of 
showing "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); 
Further, in State v. Ostler the Court reversed the defendant's conviction having 
found plain error in holding: "We hold that the trial court erreo^ by failing to 
strictly comply with Rule 11(e). That error should have been obvious to the trial 
court and was prejudicial to defendant." (State v. Ostler infra at 1072) 
Utah appellate courts have consistently ruled that a Rule 11 violation 
constitutes plain error. In the case of State v. Dean, 57 P.3d 1106, 1109 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2002) the Court ruled: 
Finally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the omission 
dealt with a substantial constitutional right. It is well established under 
Utah law that we will presume harm under plain error analysis when 
a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights 
under rule 11. 
1
 Affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court without analysis, State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d 
528 (Utah 2001) 
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See also State v. Tarnawiecki, 5 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) where the 
Court was presented with a case wherein the trial court failed to advise the 
defendant of her right to a "speedy trial before an impartial jury" during the Rule 
11 colloquy. In that case the Court ruled that the error "should have been obvious 
to the trial court... and [was] prejudicial and therefore harmful". (Id at 1228) 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in relevant 
part: "The court .... may not accept the plea until the court has found ... (2) the 
plea is voluntarily made". 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 
1274 (Utah 1988) held "Brady and Hammond2 require that in order for a plea to be 
voluntarily and knowingly made, the defendant must understand the nature and 
value of any promises made to him." (emphasis added) In the Copeland decision, 
the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further findings regarding 
the defendant's mental state and his understanding of the plea negotiation 
promises. However, the Court noted: 
There are several problems with the plea bargain entered into by 
defendant. First, it appears either that he misunderstood the promise 
the State made to him regarding its sentencing recommendation or 
that the promise was illusory. Second, and more serious, is the claim 
that defendant's understanding of the promise caused him to be misled 
2
 Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 742 (1970) 
Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975) 
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about the sentencing options available to the court and therefore the 
value of the bargain into which he was entering. (Id. at 1274) 
In the present case, the Defendant was clearly deceived by the plea 
negotiations. Admittedly, the trial court pointed out to the Defendant "You should 
also be aware that just because the State writes a letter to the parole authority 
doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation." To which the Defendant 
answered, "Yeah, I've been told." (R. 186/7 emphasis added) That caution by the 
trial court is insufficient, and in fact implies that there is significant benefit to the 
letter of recommendation. 
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 742 
(1970), the United States Supreme Court held: 
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to 
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless 
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), 
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no 
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." 
(emphasis added) 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Norris, 57 P.3d 238, 241 
(Utah Ct. App. 2002) reversed a defendant's conviction by guilty plea, when it 
determined: 
Both the trial court and the State clearly promised Norris that he could 
pursue a claim for vindictive prosecution on appeal, but neither the 
court nor the State could fulfill that promise. The court's legal error 
exaggerated the benefits Norris would receive from pleading guilty. 
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Thus it misled Norris as to "the nature and value of [the] promise[] 
made to him." (Quoting State v. Copeland at 1274.) 
The Court held: "Thus, Norris's pleas were not made voluntarily with full 
knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty." (Id. at 241) 
In the present case, the trial court failed to strictly comply with the Rule 11 
requirements during the taking of the Defendant's guilty plea. In harmony with the 
Utah Appellate Courts {State v. Dean, State v. Tarnawiecki, and State v. Ostler 
infra) any Rule 11 violation should have been obvious to the trial court. 
Furthermore, this Court has consistently held that a Rule 11 violation is presumed 
to be harmful. Therefore, all three prongs of "plain error" as reiterated in State v. 
Bradley infra have been met, and this Court should reverse the trial courts denial of 
the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to establish the basic requirement of 
Rule 11, in that the court did not ensure that the plea was voluntarily taken. 
Specifically, the court, knowing that the only concession to the Defendant in the 
plea to the crime as charged in the original information was the letter by the 
prosecution to the Board of Pardons, did not make an adequate record to ensure 
that the Defendant did in fact "understand the nature and value of any promises 
made to him." {State v. Copeland infra emphasis added) Furthermore, the trial 
court took a plea of guilty to a case in which the defendant "misunderstood the 
promise the State made to him regarding its sentencing recommendation or [did 
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not understand] that the promise was illusory." (State v. Copeland infra) The trial 
court "exaggerated the benefits [the defendant] would receive from pleading guilty. 
Thus it misled [the defendant] as to 'the nature and value of [the] promise[] made 
to him.9" (State v. Norris infra) 
It has been long established that the even the trial court, let alone the 
prosecution, has no power to bind the Board of Pardons in their decision on parole 
dates of inmates. In the case of Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) the court held: "In accordance with our sentencing scheme, the Utah 
Supreme Court has consistently held that 'the power to reduce or terminate 
sentences is exclusive with the Board [of Pardons]/ (citing McCoy v. Harris, 108 
Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721,(1945)" Further, UCA §77-27-5(1 )(a) provides in relevant 
part: 
The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority 
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and 
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in ... all 
felony cases ... may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution 
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their 
sentences commuted or terminated. 
In the present case the trial court failed to properly inform the Defendant of 
the clearly established law regarding the effect of any recommendation to the 
Board of Pardons. By allowing the Defendant to assume that the prosecution's 10 
3
 Defendant acknowledges that UCA § 77-18-5 provides for a prosecutor to provide 
written recommendations to the Board of Pardons within 30 days of sentence. 
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to 12-year maximum sentence recommendation would have any effect on the 
Board of Pardon's ultimate decision as to the Defendant's parole date, the trial 
court, in essence, participated in a illusory fiction that clearly played a role in the 
Defendant's decision to plead guilty. The trial court could have prevented this 
error by simply informing the Defendant that the effect of such a letter is minimal 
in the Board of Pardon's parole date decision. 
The State may argue that even with the failure of the trial court to establish a 
legal factual basis for the plea, the conviction should stand on the grounds of 
harmless error. The Courts have held that an error in a Rule 11 colloquy is not 
harmless. In the recent case of State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, the court was 
presented with a guilty plea that was taken with a Rule 11 colloquy that was 
defective in that the court failed to inform the defendant "the State must prove him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"4. (Id. at f22) Given that failure only, the Court 
reversed his conviction on the grounds that the Court presumed harm because, "by 
not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a 
fully informed decision." State v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 101, 104 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). "If 
the defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the 
4
 In State v. Mora, (Infra) the Court found the Rule 11 colloquy defective even 
where there was an affidavit in advance of plea signed by the defendant but not 
properly incorporated into the record. 
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guilty plea cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and 
still claim to have done justice." (State v. Mora at *J22) 
There exists a fundamental unfairness when a defendant is told that there is a 
benefit to a prosecutor's recommendation to the Board of Pardons, when in fact 
that promise, although given, is of minimal effect. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, 
the trial court participated in this fallacy, and in fact gave the illusory "plea 
bargain" further credence by stating "just because the State writes a letter to the 
parole authority doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation". (R. 
186/7 emphasis added) While recognizing that the trial court did inform the 
Defendant that he may in fact serve more time than would be recommended by the 
prosecution, the fact that the court treated this recommendation as an "agreement" 
(R. 186/2) gives the illusion that the plea bargain is in fact a bargain. 
The Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and face this 
charge due to his misunderstanding of the effect of the prosecutor's 
recommendation. The Defendant's statements at the time of entry of the plea 
indicated that he may have a valid defense of self-defense, and he relinquished that 
defense under the impression that he was getting some benefit from the 
prosecutor's agreement. The Board of Pardons gave the Defendant no benefit from 
the prosecutor's letter, and this Court should not allow a guilty plea to stand when 
it was obtained under a misunderstanding by the Defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the failure of the trial court to properly advise the Defendant of 
his rights, specifically failing to make a proper finding of competence for the plea 
pursuant to the Rule 11 requirements, and based upon the fact that the plea was 
entered under an illusory promise, the Defendant respectfully requests this court 
reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand for farther proceedings^ 
DATED this 2 , day of July, 2003. 
LNDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appelant to Mark 
Shurtliff Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300^South, 6th Floor 
PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid ihis/l_ day ^S/tflyT 
2003. 
^NDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney at Law 
27 
ADDENDUM 
28 
ADDENDUM A 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 80346 
nsideration of the Status of WALLS, Gordon Leon PRISON NO. 34293 
e above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board 
Pardons on the 18th day of March, 2003, for: 
SCHEDULING ORIGNAL HEARING 
ter a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board 
kes the following decision and.order: 
RESULTS 
Schedule for an Original Hearing in 
06/2016. 
Crime Sent Case No. Judge Expiration 
MURDER 5-L 0L1902755 HEFFERNAN LIFE 
is decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at 
y time until actual release from custody. 
order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 
th day of March, 2003, affixed my signature as Chairman for and 
behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
M. R. Sibbett, Chairman 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR^Z li'H i! i A r 10 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH .-. _- .-
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GORDON L.WALLS, 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT $ & 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 011902755 
JUDGE PAMELA HEFFERNAN 
DEFENDANT. 
I, Gordon L Walls, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that I 
understand the following facts and rights; 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
A. 
B. 
C 
D. 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
Murder 
DEGREE 
1 st-Dearee 
Felonv 
PUNISHMENT 
MIN/MAX AND/OR 
MINIMUM MANDATORY 
5-years to life U S P &/or 
$10.000 00 fine 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty (or no contest). 
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The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
That I Gordon L. Walls on or about June 11, 2001. (a) intentionally or knowingly cause the 
death of Craig Tillet: and/or (b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to Craig Tillet committed 
an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Craig Tillet; and/or (c) acting 
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to Craig Tillet and thereby caused the death of Craig Tillet 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes) I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the 
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and 
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest)' 
That I beat up the victim Craig Tillet and kicked him in the head causing his death 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and the United States I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no 
contest) I will give up all the following rights 
COUNSEL: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me I understand that I 
might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me 
I\havenot) waived my right to counsel If I have waived my right to counsel, I have done 
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no 
contest) I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s) 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney's are Stephen A Laker & Martin V 
Gravis, My attorneys and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
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my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) 
JURY TRIAL. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. I know that if Iwere to 
have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity 
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me 
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those costs 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION I know that if I 
were to have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf I al^ o know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I 
also know that if I chose not testify, the jury would be told that they could nottiold my refusal to 
testify against me 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s) If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and 
my case will be set for a trial At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element 
of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be 
unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumpton of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above 
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest) 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
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POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleding guilty (or not contest) 
to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory 
penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURENT PRISON TERMS. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the another (consecutively), or they may run at 
the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or 
no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense 
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record 
that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is) the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, 
if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
The State agrees to affirmatively recommend to the parole board that the defendant's term of 
incarceration be for a period of 10 to 12 years rather the normal period for the charge the 
defendant has pled guilty to. (Upon the understanding of Defense Counsel, the Prosecuting 
attorney and myself is normally 23 years.) 
TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not bindng 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me at to what they believe the judge 
may do are not binding on the judge. 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
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statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 29 years of age. I have attended school through the 11th Grade. I can read and 
understand the English language If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair 
my judgement when I decided to plead guilty I am not presently under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me for understanding what I am doing or from 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guitly (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final 
judgement had been entered I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I shov/good cause I 
will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any rason 
Dated thisjj^ day of lM^£(^~ ,2002 
4W^ ?rfm. 
GORDON L WALLS 
DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for Gordon L Walls, the defendant above, and that I know 
he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her, I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically compentent To the best ofmy knowledge and belief, after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true 
106 
STATE OF UTAH VS. GORDON L. WALLS 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT OF 
GUILTY PLEA & CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
CASE No. 011902755 
STEPHEN A. LAKER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. 1870 
MARTIN V. GRAVIS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. 1237 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Gordon L. Walls, 
defendant. I have reviewed this statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. 'No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained inthe Statement and in the attached Plea Agrement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public 
interest. 
DEE SMITH 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Bar No.8685 
-M^f~^ 
WILLIAM F.DAINES 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
BarNo.0805 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and 
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voluntarily made 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s) 
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this $Xs day of //JO/AJ^Q/. 
P A M E L ^ E F F W ^ N ' 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM C 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 I MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Walls here, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. This is the State of Utah versus 
4 Gordon Walls, case number 11902755. This is on for — it 
5 I indicates a change of plea. 
6 Is that correct, Mr. Gravis? 
7 MR. GRAVIS: That is correct, yes, Your Honor. The 
8 defendant at this time will be entering a plea of guilty as 
9 charged. As part of the plea negotiation, the State has 
10 agreed to recommend to the parole board that he serve a — a 
11 period of time of incarceration between 10 and 12 years. 
12 THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Daines? 
13 MR. DAINES: It is correct, Your Honor. 
i J 
14 THE COURT: Now, with regard to any recommendations, 
15 Mr. Walls, that may be what the State is going to do and I 
16 think — if — if they've indicated that they are going to do 
17 that, they would be obligated to do that — 
18 MR. DAINES: We would be. 
19 THE COURT: — as part of this agreement, but that 
20 doesn't involve the Court in any way. In other words, I will 
21 I not be writing a letter in your behalf or indicating a 
22 concurrence with that recommendation. I likely won!t write 
23 any letter. Okay? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head.) 
25 THE COURT: Just so you know that I!m not involved 
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THE COURT: Okay, If you plead guilty you're 
admitting these elements and no proof will be presented. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I know. 
THE COURT: The charge carries with it up to a life 
imprisonment, five years to — five — is it 15 to — 
MR. GRAVIS: Five. 
MR. DAINES: Five. 
THE COURT: Five to life. That's right. 
MR. DAINES: Indeterminate. 
THE COURT: Indeterminate sentence. It would be 
five years minimum to life in prison. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I know. 
THE COURT: You should also be aware that just 
because the State writes a letter to the parole authority 
doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I've been told. 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I've been told that. 
THE COURT: Okay. And what they will do is — I — 
I have no way of predicting that either. You understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: So you shouldn't rely on anything that 
the State has indicated they may or may not do in entering 
this sentence because you could serve a lot longer than what 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R, 
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they're going to recommend. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I know. 
THE COURT: Okay. You understand all that? 
THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head.) 
THE COURT: Yes? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. You have 30 days from the date 
you're sentenced to move to withdraw your guilty plea. You 
have 30 days from the date you're sentenced to file an 
appeal. But once you've pled guilty, your appeal rights are 
very limited after that. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Are you doing this of your own free will 
and choice? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises to you in 
exchange for this plea, other than the State indicating 
they'll write this letter making the statement — 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: — that they recommend a certain 
amount — number of years in prison? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, nobody has. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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